Introduction
In the stylistic framework of resource allocation problems proposed by Moreno-Ternero and , individuals are characterized by their capabilities, which are output functions that transform resources into interpersonally comparable outputs (e.g., educational achievements, infant mortality, patient survival, success in rescuing victims of a disaster). There is no ex post exchange of outputs and no ex post compensation or transfer, say, via money. Even if ex post compensation or transfer is possible, ethical priority is on the allocation of resources and outputs and the key norm under investigation is just allocation of resources and outputs.
Moreno-Ternero and build a foundation of an extended egalitarian norm using the two ethical principles, priority (Part 1997 ) and solidarity (Thomson 1983; Roemer 1986; Moulin 1987 ). Our goal is to add to this contribution by establishing parallel results using dierent axioms of priority and solidarity in a xed population model. One merit of our contribution is that population Date : July 27, 2012. variability is not essential in motivating the axioms and for establishing the foundation, while population variability plays a key role in Moreno-Ternero and . In other words, even in an environment with xed population, the same foundation for the extended egalitarian norm can be established as in their work.
Our solidarity axiom pertains to a shock in the output functions of some members or the total resources. It requires that when all the other agents have no moral responsibility for such a shock, the inuence of the shock on them should be in the same direction, that is, all these unchanged agents get more, all get less, or all get the same amount of resources as before. Part (1997, p.213) proposes, as an alternative to the principle of equality,
The Priority View: Beneting people matters more the worse o these people are.
It implicates redistributive rectication in wide scope of cases as the teleological egalitarian view does. On the other hand, unlike the teleological egalitarian view, it is not vulnerable to the leveling down objection. Sen's weak equity axiom captures this idea by requiring that a person with disability, or less capability of transforming resources into outputs, should receive more resources. Moreno-Ternero and Roemer's priority axiom is stronger in two senses. First, it not only prevents a disabled person from getting less resources but prevents her from getting too much to produce more than a less disabled person does.
Second, even when two persons cannot be ordered in terms of disability (one is disabled relative to the other), the axiom requires that no one should get more as well as produce more than the other. So one can claim that their priority axiom is stronger than what Part has suggested.
In explaining the dierence between the priority view and the egali- Neither Sen's axiom nor the priority axiom by Moreno-Ternero and seems to well accommodate the dierence in the quoted remark. One way of moving away from relatives is to consider how an allocation rule respond to a change in a person's disability level. Part's priority view will support the idea that when a person becomes more disabled, ceteris paribus, she should not get less resources. She can get more than before not because she is disabled relative to another, but because her disability level increases. So we propose an alternative axiom, called disability monotonicity as an alternative priority axiom.
We nd that under agreement, disability monotonicity is closely related with Sen's axiom and the priority axiom by Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006). In fact, these axioms will be used alternatively, combined with agreement, to generate a characterization of the same family of rules.
One may criticize that the framework is not appropriate since ex post compensation or transfer may be essential for achieving eciency.
A modest reaction to this point is that the agents in our model put so much weight on allocation of resources and outputs that any ex post compensation cannot make substantial dierences in their welfare (as for lexicographic preferences ordering over the space of resources, outputs, and ex post compensation).
Another reaction, somewhat provocative to some economists, is that the primary concern for us is moral evaluation of resource-output allocation; preferences satisfaction, relevant to eciency, is secondary.
There is an innitely divisible resource good of a certain amount W ≥ 0. The resource good has to be divided among n agents. welfare-egalitarian rule utilizes an index function that is responsive to outputs only (inputs do not count). These two rules are discussed extensively in the literature, in particular, by Dworkin (1981a Dworkin ( , 1981b . A rich spectrum of egalitarianism is provided through a variety of index functions between the two extreme rules.
Preliminaries
There is a nite number of agents, each of whom utilizes a resource good to produce an output. A total amount of resources is to be allocated among the agents and individual outputs are interpersonally comparable.
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of agents and assume n ≥ 3. An individual agent i ∈ N is characterized by her output function y i : R + → R + which is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing, unbounded, and y i (0) = 0. Let Y * be the set of all such output functions and call it the universal set of output functions. An allocation rule is a function F that associates with each economy No-Domination. For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E, there is no pair i, j ∈ N such that F i (e) < F j (e) and y i (F i (e)) < y j (F j (e)).
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006) call this axiom priority. A milder principle, which is more directly connected to Part's principle is to require that when i is disabled relatively to j, more resources should be oered to i than to j (referred to as the weak equity axiom by Sen 1973).
(Disability-)Order-Preservation. For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E and all i, j ∈ N , if i is disabled relatively to j, then F i (e) ≥ F j (e).
Note that disability-order-preservation does not prevent disabled i from producing more than less disabled j, that is, disabled i may receive so much more than j that i's output may be higher than j's, in which case, no-domination is violated. The next axiom requires that disabled i should not produce more than j does.
No-Reversal (in Outputs). For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E and all i, j ∈ N , if i is disabled relatively to j, then y i (F i (e)) ≤ y j (F j (e)).
Note that each of the three axioms implies equal treatment of equals;
for all e = (y, W ) ∈ E, if y i = y j , then F i (e) = F j (e). Note also that no-domination implies order-preservation and no-reversal, conversely, if the domain is well-ordered, the combination of order-preservation and no-reversal implies no-domination. Without the well-orderedness of the domain, the converse longer holds.
According to Part's priority view, a disabled person should be given more attention not because of her disability relative to another but because her disability level (Part 1997 , p.214). The above priority axioms are concerned with relatives (Part 1997 ) since they all connect whom to give more with the relative disability comparison. The next axiom is not. We think that Part's priority view, distinct from the relative concern, will support the idea that when a person becomes more disabled, ceteris paribus, her resource should not decrease. The disabled person can get more than before not because she is disabled relative to another, but because her disability level increases.
Disability Monotonicity. For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E, all i ∈ N , and all The logical relation between the above priority axioms will be discussed in Section 4. These priority principles will be considered in combination with other basic axioms in the literature of fair allocation.
3.2. Solidarity Axioms. The rst solidarity axiom pertains to a shock in the output functions of some agents or resources. It requires that any such shock should inuence all unchanged agents in the same direction, that is, all get more, all get less or all get the same as before (Moulin, 1987; Chun, 1999 Chun, , 2000 .
Agreement. For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E and e = (y , W ) ∈ E, and all
An implication of agreement is that whenever the total amount of resources oered to a subgroup of agents, whose output functions remain unaected by a shock, remains unaected, all the agents in the subgroup should get the same resources (Moulin 1987; Chun 1999 Chun , 2000 Chun , 2006 Separability. For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E and e = (y ,
Another implication of agreement is the solidarity that pertains to resource shock. The axiom says that when a bad or a good resource shock occurs to an economy, all the members should share in the calamity or windfall (Roemer, 1986; Chun and Thomson, 1988 ).
Resource Monotonicity. For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E and e = (y,
Evidently, an implication of resource monotonicity is continuity in resources W , or resource continuity.
Main results
We show that agreement is equivalent to the combination of separability and resource monotonicity. Proof. We skip the evident proof that agreement implies separability and resource monotonicity. To prove the converse, let F be a rule satisfying separability and resource monotonicity. Let e = (y, W ) ∈ E and e = (y , W ) ∈ E, and M ⊆ N be such that y M = y M . We show below that
Without loss of generality, assume that i∈M F i (e) ≥ i∈M F i (e ).
If i∈M F i (e) = i∈M F i (e ), then F M (e) = F M (e ) by separability. Now consider the case i∈M F i (e) > i∈M F i (e ). By resource continuity, there is W * such that Proposition 2. Given a rich domain, if a rule satises agreement, noreversal, and disability monotonicity, then it satises no-domination.
Proof. Let E ≡ Y N × R + be a max-closed domain (or any rich domain). Let F be a rule satisfying agreement, no-reversal and disability monotonicity.
Step 1.
For all e = (y, W ) ∈ E, all i ∈ N , and all y i ≤ y i ,
Let e = (y, W ) ∈ E, i ∈ N , and y i be such that y i ≤ y i . Let x ≡ F (y, W ) and x ≡ F (y i , y −i , W ). Then by disability monotonicity, x i ≤ x i . If x i = x i , then by agreement and resource constraint,
Step 2. F satises no-domination. Suppose by contradiction that for e ≡ (y, W ) and i, j ∈ N , x i < x j and y i (x i ) < y j (x j ) where x ≡ F (e). Let y i ∈ Y be such that max{y i , y j } ≤ y i and y i (x i ) < y j (x j ). Existence of such y i is guaranteed by the domain richness. Let e ≡ ((y i , y −i ), W ) and x ≡ F (e ). Since y i is disabled relative to y i , then by Step 1, x i ≤ x i and x j ≤ x j . Then y i (x i ) ≤ y i (x i )< y j (x j ) ≤ y j (x j ). Hence y i (x i ) < y j (x j ), which contradicts no-reversal at e .
We next dene a family of rules that satisfy all priority axioms and agreement. Let Φ be the class of all functions ϕ : R 2 ++ ∪ (0, 0) −→ R + , continuous on its domain and non decreasing, such that inf{ϕ(x, y)} = ϕ(0, 0) = 0 and, for all (x, y) > (z, t), ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(z, t). Let ϕ be a function in the class Φ. For all i ∈ I, dene the function ψ i : R + −→ R + that determines the ϕvalue that agent i achieves, depending on the wealth she receives, i.e., ψ i (w) = ϕ(w, y i (w)) for all w ∈ R + . Then we can dene the corresponding index-egalitarian rule as the rule intro- Theorem 1. Given a covering domain, a rule satises no-domination and agreement if and only if it is index-egalitarian. When the domain is well-ordered, a rule satises order-preservation, no-reversal, and agreement if and only if it is index-egalitarian.
The proof is provided in the appendix. We next establish an alternative characterization replacing no-domination with the combination of no-reversal and disability monotonicity.
Theorem 2. Given a covering rich domain, a rule satises no-reversal, disability monotonicity, and agreement if and only if it is index-egalitarian. Proof. The only-if part follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 2.
We only have to prove that all index-egalitarian rules satisfy disability monotonicity. Let F be the index-egalitarian rule represented by ϕ. Let (y, W ) ∈ E, i ∈ N , and y i ∈ Y be such that y i ≤ y i . Let y ≡ (y i , y −i ), x ≡ F (y, W ) and x ≡ F (y , W ). Then there exist λ, λ ≥ 0 such that
and so x h ≥ x h . And by resource constraint, x i ≤ x i , as required by disability monotonicity.
It follows from Proposition 1 that:
Corollary 1. Given a covering domain, a rule satises no-domination (or, no-reversal and disability monotonicity), separability, and resource monotonicity if and only if it is index-egalitarian. When the covering domain is also rich, a rule satises no-reversal and disability monotonicity, separability, and resource monotonicity if and only if it is index-egalitarian. Invariance: For all e = (y, W ) ∈ ξ and any y i ∈ Y such that y i (F i (e)) = y i (F i (e)), Fix y * ∈ Y . Given a rule F , for all α ∈ R + , let E(α) be the set of economies where an agent with y * exists and any agent with y * receives α, that is, E(α) ≡ {e ∈ E : for some i ∈ N y i = y * and F i (e) = α}. Let C(α) be the set of all resource-outcome pairs in all economies in E(α), that is, C(α) ≡ {(a, b) ∈ R 2 + : there is e ∈ E(α) such that for some j ∈ N , F j (e) = a and y j (a) = b}. Lemma 1. If F satises no-domination and resource continuity, then for all y ∈ Y, all M ⊂ N , and all α ∈ R + , there exists W * ∈ R + such that i∈M F i (y, W * ) = α.
Proof. Let 
is also unbounded, since y j is unbounded.
We show that there isn such that
Lemma 2. Assume that F is a rule satisfying agreement and nodomination. For all e ≡ (y, W ) and all three distinct i, j, k ∈ N , there is e ≡ (y , W ) such that y i = y i , y j = y k = y j , and F i (e ) = F i (e) and
Proof. Let e ≡ (y, W ) and i, j, k are distinct. Let y be such that y i = y i , y j = y k = y j . By Lemma 1, there is W such that F i (e ) + F j (e ) = F i (e) + F j (e), where e ≡ (y , W ). By separability, F i (e ) = F i (e) and F j (e ) = F j (e). Since y j = y k = y j , then (by no-domination) F k (e ) = F j (e).
We show that for all α ≥ 0, C(α) is downward sloping.
Lemma 3. If F satises no-domination and agreement, then C(α) is downward sloping, that is, for all (a, b), (a , b ) ∈ C(α) with a < a , we have b ≥ b .
Proof. Assume that F satises no-domination and agreement. To prove that C(α) is downward sloping, suppose, to the contrary, that for some (a, b), (a , b ) ∈ C(α), a < a and b < b . By denition of C(α), there exist e = (y, W ) ∈ E(α) and e = (y , W ) ∈ E(α) such that for some i, j ∈ N such that (a, b) = (F i (e), y i (F i (e))) and (a , b ) = (F j (e ), y j (F j (e ))). By Lemma 2, we may let y 1 = y * = y 1 and assume that 1, i, j are three distinct agents. Note that F 1 (e) = F 1 (e ) = α. Let y be such thatŷ {1,i,j} = y {1,i,j} andŷ N \{1,i,j} = y N \{1,i,j} . By Lemma 1, there isŴ such that denotingê ≡ (ŷ,Ŵ ),
Then by separability, F {1,i,j} (ê) = F {1,i,j} (e ). Let y such that y i = y i , y j = y j , y 1 = y * and for all other h = i, j, 1, y h = y h . By Lemma 1, there is W ≥ 0 such that denoting e ≡ (y , W ),
Suppose F 1 (e ) > α. Then applying agreement to e and e , we get F i (e ) > a. Likewise, applying agreement toê and e , we get F j (e ) > a . Therefore, F 1 (e ) + F i (e ) + F j (e ) > α + a + a , contradicting (A.1). Therefore F 1 (e ) ≤ α. Similarly, we can show F 1 (e ) ≥ α. Hence F 1 (e ) = α.
Then by agreement, F i (e ) = a and F j (e ) = a . Finally, since
there exist e 1 = (y, W 1 ) and i ∈ N such that y 1 = y * , F 1 (e) = α 1 , and (F i (e 1 ), y i (F i (e 1 ))) = (a, b). By Lemma 1, there is W 2 such that
. Then by resource monotonicity,
, and so y i (
sloping, contradicting the conclusion in Lemma 3.
The next lemma says, by varying α ≥ 0, C(α)'s can cover the positive quadrant.
Lemma 5. For all (a, b) ∈ R 2 ++ ∪ {(0, 0)}, there is a unique α ≥ 0 such that (a, b) ∈ C(α).
Proof. Let The next lemma says that if α 1 > α 2 , then C(α 1 ) lies above C(α 2 ).
. Let e = (y, W ) ∈ E(α 2 ) and i ∈ N be such that y 1 = y * , F 1 (e) = α 2 , and (F i (e), y i (F i (e))) = (a, b). By Lemma 1, there is W such that 
Then, by the fact that F satises no-domination, resource monotonicity, and by Lemma 7, ϕ ∈ Φ.
We now show that F (y, W ) = E ϕ (y, W ), for all (y, W ) ∈ E. Let e = (y, W ) ∈ E.
If for some i ∈ N , y i = y * , then by letting λ = F i (e), we have for all j ∈ N , (F j (e), y j (F j (e))) ∈ C(λ). Therefore ψ j (F j (e)) = ϕ(F j (e), y j (F j (e))) = λ for all j. Since j∈N F j (e) = W , F (e) = E ϕ (e) by denition.
We now consider the case that there is no i with y i = y * . We will show that there is unique α ≥ 0 such that (F h (e), y h (F h (e))) ∈ C(α) for all h ∈ N . Consider y ≡ (y * , y 2 , . . . , y n ). Then by Lemma 1, there is W such that h∈N \{1} F h (y , W ) = h∈N \{1} F h (e). Then by separability, for all h ∈ N \{1}, F h (y , W ) = F h (e). Hence for all h ∈ N \{1}, (F h (e), y h (F h (e))) ∈ C(α). Similarly, we can show (F 1 (e), y 1 (F 1 (e))) ∈ C(α). Therefore, for all h ∈ N , ψ h (F h (e)) = ϕ(F h (e), y h (F j (e))) = α and therefore, F (e) = E ϕ (e).
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 8. Order-preservation (or no-reversal), invariance, and separability imply no-domination. Proof. Let F be a rule satisfying order-preservation, invariance, and separability. Suppose that F fails to satisfy no-domination. Then there are e = (y, W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ N such that F i (e) < F i (e) and y i (F i (e)) < y j (F j (e)). For all h ∈ N , let a h ≡ F h (e) and b h ≡ y h (a h ). Then (a i , b i ) < (a j , b j ).
Let y i and y j be such that y i is disabled relative to y j , y i (a i ) = y i (a i ) = b i , and y j (a j ) = y j (a j ) = b j . Let y ≡ (y i , y N \{i} ) and e ≡ (y , W ). By invariance, F i (e ) = a i . Then by separability, for all h = i, F h (e ) = a h . Let y ≡ (y i , y j , y N \{i,j} ) and e ≡ (y , W ). By invariance, F j (e ) = F j (e ) = a j . Then by separability, for all h = j, F h (e ) = F h (e ) = a h . In particular, F i (e ) = a i < a j = F j (e ). Since y i is disabled relative to y j , the inequality contradicts order-preservation.
For the proof of the statement with no-reversal, use y i and y j such that y j is disabled relative to y i . Then use the argument. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is clear that any index egalitarian rule satises invariance. Thus, the result follows from the above lemma and Theorem 1.
